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Abstract
The development of cloud computing services is speeding up the rate in which the organizations outsource their
computational services or sell their idle computational resources. Even though migrating to the cloud remains a
tempting trend from a ﬁnancial perspective, there are several other aspects that must be taken into account by
companies before they decide to do so. One of the most important aspect refers to security: while some cloud
computing security issues are inherited from the solutions adopted to create such services, many new security
questions that are particular to these solutions also arise, including those related to how the services are organized
and which kind of service/data can be placed in the cloud. Aiming to give a better understanding of this complex
scenario, in this article we identify and classify the main security concerns and solutions in cloud computing, and
propose a taxonomy of security in cloud computing, giving an overview of the current status of security in this
emerging technology.
Introduction
Security is considered a key requirement for cloud com-
puting consolidation as a robust and feasible multi-
purpose solution [1]. This viewpoint is shared by many
distinct groups, including academia researchers [2,3],
business decision makers [4] and government organi-
zations [5,6]. The many similarities in these perspec-
tives indicate a grave concern on crucial security and
legal obstacles for cloud computing, including service
availability, data conﬁdentiality, provider lock-in and
reputation fate sharing [7]. These concerns have their
origin not only on existing problems, directly inherited
from the adopted technologies, but are also related to
new issues derived from the composition of essential
cloud computing features like scalability, resource shar-
ing and virtualization (e.g., data leakage and hypervisor
vulnerabilities) [8]. The distinction between these classes
is more easily identiﬁable by analyzing the deﬁnition of the
essential cloud computing characteristics proposed by the
NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology)
in [9], which also introduces the SPI model for services
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(SaaS, PaaS, and IaaS) and deployment (private, public,
community, and hybrid).
Due to the ever growing interest in cloud computing,
there is an explicit and constant eﬀort to evaluate the
current trends in security for such technology, consider-
ing both problems already identiﬁed and possible solu-
tions [10]. An authoritative reference in the area is the
risk assessment developed by ENISA (European Network
and Information Security Agency) [5]. Not only does
it list risks and vulnerabilities, but it also oﬀers a sur-
vey of related works and research recommendations. A
similarly work is the security guidance provided by the
Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) [6], which deﬁnes security
domains congregating speciﬁc functional aspects, from
governance and compliance to virtualization and iden-
tity management. Both documents present a plethora of
security concerns, best practices and recommendations
regarding all types of services in NIST’s SPI model, as well
as possible problems related to cloud computing, encom-
passing from data privacy to infrastructural conﬁguration.
Albeit valuable, these studies do not focus on quantifying
their observations, something important for developing
a comprehensive understanding of the challenges still
undermining the potential of cloud computing.
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The main goal of this article is to identify, classify,
organize and quantify the main security concerns and
solutions associated to cloud computing, helping in the
task of pinpointing the concerns that remain unanswered.
Aiming to organize this information into a useful tool
for comparing, relating and classifying already identi-
ﬁed concerns and solutions as well as future ones, we
also present a taxonomy proposal for cloud comput-
ing security. We focus on issues that are speciﬁc to
cloud computing, without losing sight of important issues
that also exist in other distributed systems. This article
extends our previous work presented in [11], providing an
enhanced review of the cloud computing security taxon-
omy previously presented, as well as a deeper analysis of
the related work by discussing the main security frame-
works currently available; in addition, we discuss further
the security aspects related to virtualization in cloud
computing, a fundamental yet still underserved ﬁeld of
research.
Cloud computing security
Key references such as CSA’s security guidance [6] and
top threats analysis [12], ENISA’s security assessment [5]
and the cloud computing deﬁnitions from NIST [9] high-
light diﬀerent security issues related to cloud computing
that require further studies for being appropriately han-
dled and, consequently, for enhancing technology accep-
tance and adoption. Emphasis is given to the distinction
between services in the form of software (SaaS), platform
(PaaS) and infrastructure (IaaS), which are commonly
used as the fundamental basis for cloud service classiﬁca-
tion. However, no other methods are standardized or even
employed to organize cloud computing security aspects
apart from cloud deployment models, service types or
traditional security models.
Aiming to concentrate and organize information related
to cloud security and to facilitate future studies, in this
section we identify the main problems in the area and
group them into a model composed of seven categories,
based on the aforementioned references . Namely, the
categories are: network security, interfaces, data secu-
rity, virtualization, governance, compliance and legal
issues. Each category includes several potential security
problems, resulting in a classiﬁcation with subdivisions
that highlights the main issues identiﬁed in the base
references:
1. Network security: Problems associated with network
communications and conﬁgurations regarding cloud
computing infrastructures. The ideal network
security solution is to have cloud services as an
extension of customers’ existing internal networks
[13], adopting the same protection measures and
security precautions that are locally implemented
and allowing them to extend local strategies to any
remote resource or process [14].
(a) Transfer security: Distributed architectures,
massive resource sharing and virtual machine
(VM) instances synchronization imply more
data in transit in the cloud, thus requiring
VPN mechanisms for protecting the system
against sniﬃng, spooﬁng, man-in-the-middle
and side-channel attacks.
(b) Firewalling: Firewalls protect the provider’s
internal cloud infrastructure against insiders
and outsiders [15]. They also enable VM
isolation, ﬁne-grained ﬁltering for addresses
and ports, prevention of Denial-of-Service
(DoS) and detection of external security
assessment procedures. Eﬀorts for developing
consistent ﬁrewall and similar security
measures speciﬁc for cloud environments
[16,17] reveal the urge for adapting existing
solutions for this new computing paradigm.
(c) Security conﬁguration: Conﬁguration of
protocols, systems and technologies to
provide the required levels of security and
privacy without compromising performance
or eﬃciency [18].
2. Interfaces: Concentrates all issues related to user,
administrative and programming interfaces for using
and controlling clouds.
(a) API: Programming interfaces (essential to
IaaS and PaaS) for accessing virtualized
resources and systems must be protected in
order to prevent malicious use [19-23].
(b) Administrative interface: Enables remote
control of resources in an IaaS (VM
management), development for PaaS (coding,
deploying, testing) and application tools for
SaaS (user access control, conﬁgurations).
(c) User interface: End-user interface for
exploring provided resources and tools (the
service itself), implying the need of adopting
measures for securing the environment
[24-27].
(d) Authentication: Mechanisms required to
enable access to the cloud [28]. Most services
rely on regular accounts [20,29,30]
consequently being susceptible to a plethora
of attacks [31-35] whose consequences are
boosted by multi-tenancy and resource
sharing.
3. Data security: Protection of data in terms of
conﬁdentiality, availability and integrity (which can
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be applied not only to cloud environments, but any
solution requiring basic security levels) [36].
(a) Cryptography: Most employed practice to
secure sensitive data [37], thoroughly
required by industry, state and federal
regulations [38].
(b) Redundancy: Essential to avoid data loss.
Most business models rely on information
technology for its core functionalities and
processes [39,40] and, thus, mission-critical
data integrity and availability must be
ensured.
(c) Disposal: Elementary data disposal
techniques are insuﬃcient and commonly
referred as deletion [41].In the cloud, the
complete destruction of data, including log
references and hidden backup registries, is an
important requirement [42].
4. Virtualization: Isolation between VMs, hypervisor
vulnerabilities and other problems associated to the
use of virtualization technologies [43].
(a) Isolation: Although logically isolated, all VMs
share the same hardware and consequently
the same resources, allowing malicious
entities to exploit data leaks and cross-VM
attacks [44]. The concept of isolation can also
be applied to more ﬁne-grained assets, such
as computational resources, storage and
memory.
(b) Hypervisor vulnerabilities: The hypervisor is
the main software component of
virtualization. Even though there are known
security vulnerabilities for hypervisors,
solutions are still scarce and often
proprietary, demanding further studies to
harden these security aspects.
(c) Data leakage: Exploit hypervisor
vulnerabilities and lack of isolation controls
in order to leak data from virtualized
infrastructures, obtaining sensitive customer
data and aﬀecting conﬁdentiality and
integrity.
(d) VM identiﬁcation: Lack of controls for
identifying virtual machines that are being
used for executing a speciﬁc process or for
storing ﬁles.
(e) Cross-VM attacks: Includes attempts to
estimate provider traﬃc rates in order to
steal cryptographic keys and increase chances
of VM placement attacks. One example
consists in overlapping memory and storage
regions initially dedicated to a single virtual
machine, which also enables other
isolation-related attacks.
5. Governance: Issues related to (losing) administrative
and security controls in cloud computing solutions
[45,46].
(a) Data control: Moving data to the cloud means
losing control over redundancy, location, ﬁle
systems and other relevant conﬁgurations.
(b) Security control: Loss of governance over
security mechanisms and policies, as terms of
use prohibit customer-side vulnerability
assessment and penetration tests while
insuﬃcient Service Level Agreements (SLA)
lead to security gaps.
(c) Lock-in: User potential dependency on a
particular service provider due to lack of
well-established standards (protocols and
data formats), consequently becoming
particularly vulnerable to migrations and
service termination.
6. Compliance: Includes requirements related to service
availability and audit capabilities [47,48].
(a) Service Level Agreements (SLA):
Mechanisms to ensure the required service
availability and the basic security procedures
to be adopted [49].
(b) Loss of service: Service outages are not
exclusive to cloud environments but are
more serious in this context due to the
interconnections between services (e.g., a
SaaS using virtualized infrastructures
provided by an IaaS), as shown in many
examples [50-52]. This leads to the need of
strong disaster recovery policies and provider
recommendations to implement
customer-side redundancy if applicable.
(c) Audit: Allows security and availability
assessments to be performed by customers,
providers and third-party participants.
Transparent and eﬃcient methodologies are
necessary for continuously analyzing service
conditions [53] and are usually required by
contracts or legal regulations. There are
solutions being developed to address this
problem by oﬀering a transparent API for
automated auditing and other useful
functionalities [54].
(d) Service conformity: Related to how
contractual obligations and overall service
requirements are respected and oﬀered based
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on the SLAs predeﬁned and basic service and
customer needs.
7. Legal issues: Aspects related to judicial requirements
and law, such as multiple data locations and privilege
management.
(a) Data location: Customer data held in
multiple jurisdictions depending on
geographic location [55] are aﬀected, directly
or indirectly, by subpoena law-enforcement
measures.
(b) E-discovery: As a result of a law-enforcement
measures, hardware might be conﬁscated for
investigations related to a particular
customer, aﬀecting all customers whose data
were stored in the same hardware [56-58].
Data disclosure is critical in this case.
(c) Provider privilege: Malicious activities of
provider insiders are potential threats to
conﬁdentiality, availability and integrity of
customers’ data and processes’ information
[59,60].
(d) legislation: Juridical concerns related to new
concepts introduced by cloud computing
[61].
Cloud computing security taxonomy
The analysis of security concerns in the context of cloud
computing solutions shows that each issue brings diﬀer-
ent impacts on distinct assets. Aiming to create a security
model both for studying security aspects in this context
and for supporting decision making, in this section we
consider the risks and vulnerabilities previously presented
and arrange them in hierarchical categories, thus creating
a cloud security taxonomy. The main structure of the pro-
posed taxonomy, along with its ﬁrst classiﬁcation levels,
are depicted in Figure 1.
The three ﬁrst groups correspond to fundamental (and
often related) security principles [7] (Chapters 3-8).
The architecture dimension is subdivided into network
security, interfaces and virtualization issues, comprising
both user and administrative interfaces to access the
cloud. It also comprises security during transferences of
data and virtual machines, as well as other virtualization
related issues, such as isolation and cross-VM attacks.
This organization is depicted in Figure 2. The architec-
ture group allows a clearer division of responsibilities
between providers and customers, and also an analysis
of their security roles depending on the type of service
oﬀered (Software, Platform or Infrastructure). This sug-
gests that the security mechanisms used must be clearly
stated before the service is contracted, deﬁning which
role is responsible for providing ﬁrewalling capabilities,
access control features and technology-speciﬁc require-
ments (such as those related to virtualization).
The compliance dimension introduces responsibilities
toward services and providers. The former includes SLA
concerns, loss of service based on outages and chain fail-
ures, and auditing capabilities as well as transparency and
security assessments. The latter refers to loss of control
over data and security policies and conﬁgurations, and
also lock-in issues resulting from lack of standards, migra-
tions and service terminations. The complete scenario is
presented in Figure 3.
The privacy dimension includes data security itself
(from sensitive data, regulations and data loss to dis-
posal and redundancy) and legal issues (related tomultiple
jurisdictions derived from diﬀerent locations where data
and services are hosted). The expansion of this group is
represented in Figure 4. We note that the concerns in this
dimension cover the complete information lifecycle (i.e.,
generation, use, transfer, transformation, storage, archiv-
ing, and destruction) inside the provider perimeter and in
its immediate boundaries (or interfaces) to the users.
A common point between all groups is the intrinsic con-
nection to data and service lifecycles. Both privacy and
compliance must be ensured through all states of data,
including application information or customer assets,
while security in this case is more oriented towards how
the underlying elements (e.g., infrastructural hardware
and software) are protected.
Current status of cloud security
A clear perspective of the main security problems regard-
ing cloud computing and on how they can be organized
Figure 1 Cloud computing security taxonomy. Top level overview of the security taxonomy proposed, highlighting the three main categories:
security related to privacy, architecture and compliance.
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Figure 2 Security taxonomy - architecture. Details from architecture category, which is divided in network, host, application, data (security and
storage), security management, and identity and access controls – all these elements are directly connected to the infrastructure and architecture
adopted to implement or use a cloud solution.
to ease decision making is the primary step for having
a comprehensive overview of the current status of cloud
security. In this section, we analyze industry and academia
viewpoints focusing on strategic study areas that need
to be further developed. This study is based on more
than two hundred diﬀerent references including white
papers, technical reports, scientiﬁc papers and other rele-
vant publications. They were analyzed in terms of security
problems and solutions by evaluating the number of cita-
tions for each case. We used a quantitative approach to
identify the amount of references related to each category
of concerns or solutions. Our goal is not to determine
if the presented solutions completely solve an identiﬁed
concern, since most of the referenced authors agree that
this is an involved task. Nonetheless, we identify the num-
ber of references dealing with each concern, providing
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Figure 3 Security taxonomy - compliance. Details from compliance category, divided in lifecycle controls and governance, risk and other
compliance related issues (such as continuous improvement policies).
Figure 4 Security taxonomy - privacy. Details from privacy category, initially divided in concerns and principles. Concerns are related to the
complete data lifecycle, from generation, use and transfer to transformation, storage, archival and destruction. Principles are guidelines related to
privacy in the cloud.
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some useful insight on which are the concerns that have
received more attention from the research community
and which have not been so extensively analyzed. Some
observations about the analysis method:
1. The references consulted came from diﬀerent
research segments, including academia,
organizations, and companies. Due to the article’s
length limitations, we did not include all the
consulted references in the References section. In the
following we present some of the main sources of
consultation:
(a) Academia: conference papers and journals
published by IEEE, ACM, Springer,
Webscience, and Scipress.
(b) Organizations: reports, white papers, and
interviews from SANS Institute, CSA, NIST,
ENISA, Gartner Group, KVM.org,
OpenGrid, OpenStack, and OpenNebula.
(c) Companies: white papers, manuals,
interviews, and web content from
ERICSSON, IBM, XEROX, Cisco, VMWare,
XEN, CITRIX, EMC, Microsoft, and
Salesforce.
2. Each reference was analyzed aiming to identify all the
mentioned concerns covered and solutions provided.
Therefore, one reference can produce more than one
entry on each speciﬁed category.
3. Some security perspectives were not covered in this
paper, as each security/concern category can be
sub-divided in ﬁner-grained aspects such as:
authentication, integrity, network communications,
etc.
We present the security concerns and solutions using
pie charts in order to show the representativeness of each
category/group in the total amount of references identi-
ﬁed. The comparison between areas is presented using
radar graphs to identify how many solutions address each
concern category/group.
Security concerns
The results obtained for the number of citations on secu-
rity issues is shown in Figure 5. The three major problems
identiﬁed in these references are legal issues, compliance
and loss of control over data. These legal- and governance-
related concerns are followed by the ﬁrst technical issue,
isolation, with 7% of citations. The least cited problems
are related to security conﬁguration concerns, loss of ser-
vice (albeit this is also related to compliance, which is a
major problem), ﬁrewalling and interfaces.
Grouping the concerns using the categories presented
in section “Cloud computing security” leads to the
Figure 5 Security problems. Pie chart for security concerns.
Gonzalez et al. Journal of Cloud Computing: Advances, Systems and Applications 2012, 1:11 Page 8 of 18
http://www.journalofcloudcomputing.com/content/1/1/11
Figure 6 Security problems with grouped categories. Pie chart for security concerns with grouped categories (seven altogether: legal issues,
compliance, governance, virtualization, data security, interfaces and network security).
Figure 7 Security solutions with grouped categories. Pie chart for solutions with grouped categories, showing a clear lack for virtualization
security mechanisms in comparison to its importance in terms of concerns citations.
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construction of Figure 6. This ﬁgure shows that legal and
governance issues represent a clear majority with 73% of
concern citations, showing a deep consideration of legal
issues such as data location and e-discovery, or gover-
nance ones like loss of control over security and data. The
technical issue more intensively evaluated (12%) is virtual-
ization, followed by data security, interfaces and network
security.
Virtualization is one of the main novelties employed by
cloud computing in terms of technologies employed, con-
sidering virtual infrastructures, scalability and resource
sharing, and its related problems represent the ﬁrst major
technical concern.
Security solutions
When analyzing citations for solutions, we used the same
approach described in the beginning of this section. The
results are presented in Figure 7, which shows the percent-
age of solutions in each category deﬁned in section “Cloud
computing security”, and also in Figure 8, which highlights
the contribution of each individual sub-category.
When we compare Figures 6 and 7, it is easy to observe
that the number of citations covering security problems
related to legal issues, compliance and governance is high
(respectively 24%, 22%, and 17%); however, the same also
happens when we consider the number of references
proposing solutions for those issues (which represent
respectively 29%, 27%, and 14% of the total number of
citations). In other words, these concerns are higly rele-
vant but a large number solutions are already available for
tackling them.
The situation is completely diﬀerent when we analyze
technical aspects such as virtualization, isolation and data
leakage. Indeed, virtualization amounts for 12% of prob-
lem references and only 3% for solutions. Isolation is a
perfect example of such discrepancy as the number of
citations for such problems represents 7% in Figure 5,
while solutions correspond to only 1% of the graph from
Figure 8. We note that, for this speciﬁc issue, special care
has been taken when assessing the most popular virtual
machine solution providers (e.g., XEN, VMWARE, and
KVM) aiming to verify their concerns and available solu-
tions. A conclusion that can be drawn from this situation
is that such concerns are also signiﬁcant but yet little is
available in terms of solutions. This indicates the need of
evaluating potential areas still to be developed in order
to provide better security conditions when migrating data
and processes in the cloud.
Figure 8 Security solutions. Pie chart for solutions citations.
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Comparison
The diﬀerences between problem and solution citations
presented in the previous sections can be observed in
Figure 9.
Axis values correspond to the number of citations found
among the references studied. Blue areas represent con-
cern citations and lighter red indicates solutions, while
darker red shows where those areas overlap. In other
words, light red areas are problems with more citations
for solutions than problems – they might be meaningful
problems, but there are many solutions already addressing
them – while blue areas represent potential subjects that
have received little attention so far, indicating the need for
further studies.
Figure 9 clearly shows the lack of development regard-
ing data control mechanisms, hypervisor vulnerabilities
assessment and isolation solutions for virtualized envi-
ronments. On the other hand, areas such as legal con-
cerns, SLAs, compliance and audit policies have a quite
satisfactory coverage. The results for grouped categories
(presented in section 4) are depicted in Figure 10.
Figure 10 shows that virtualization problems represent
an area that requires studies for addressing issues such as
isolation, data leakage and cross-VM attacks; on the other
hand, areas such as compliance and network security
encompass concerns for which there are already a con-
siderable number of solutions or that are not considered
highly relevant.
Finally, Considering virtualization as key element for
future studies, Figure 11 presents a comparison focus-
ing on ﬁve virtualization-related problems: isolation (of
computational resources, such as memory and storage
capabilities), hypervisor vulnerabilities, data leakage,
cross-VM attacks and VM identiﬁcation. The contrast
related to isolation and cross-VM attacks is more evident
than for the other issues. However, the number of solution
citations for all issues is notably low if compared to any
other security concern, reaﬃrming the need for further
researches in those areas.
Related work
An abundant number of related works and publications
exist in the literature, emphasizing the importance and
demand of security solutions for cloud computing. How-
ever, we did not identify any full taxonomy that addresses
directly the security aspects related to cloud comput-
ing. We only identiﬁed some simpliﬁed models that
were developed to cover speciﬁc security aspects such as
authentication. We were able to recognize two main types
of works: (1) security frameworks, which aim to aggregate
information about security and also to oﬀer sets of best
practices and guidelines when using cloud solutions, and
(2) publications that identify future trends and propose
solutions or areas of interest for research. Each category
and corresponding references are further analyzed in the
following subsections.
Security frameworks
Security frameworks concentrate information on security
and privacy aiming to provide a compilation of risks, vul-
nerabilities and best practices to avoid or mitigate them.
There are several entities that are constantly publishing
material related to cloud computing security, including
ENISA, CSA, NIST, CPNI (Centre for the Protection of
Figure 9 Comparison between citations. Radar chart comparing citations related to concerns and solutions, showing the disparities for each
security category adopted.
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Figure 10 Comparison between citations with grouped categories. Radar chart grouping the categories, showing the diﬀerence between
citations about concerns and solutions regarding each category.
National Infrastructure fromUK government) and ISACA
(the Information Systems Audit and Control Association).
In this paper we focus on the ﬁrst three entities, which
by themselves provide a quite comprehensive overview of
issues and solutions and, thus, allowing a broad under-
standing of the current status of cloud security.
ENISA
ENISA is an agency responsible for achieving high and
eﬀective level of network and information security within
the European Union [62]. In the context of cloud comput-
ing, they published an extensive study covering beneﬁts
and risks related to its use [5]. In this study, the security
risks are divided in four categories:
• Policy and organizational: issues related to
governance, compliance and reputation;
• Technical: issues derived from technologies used to
implement cloud services and infrastructures, such as
isolation, data leakage and interception, denial of
service attacks, encryption and disposal;
• Legal: risks regarding jurisdictions, subpoena and
e-discovery;
Figure 11 Comparison for virtualization. Radar chart only for virtualization issues.
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• Not cloud speciﬁc: other risks that are not unique to
cloud environments, such as network management,
privilege escalation and logging;
As a top recommendation for security in cloud com-
puting, ENISA suggests that providers must ensure some
security practices to customers and also a clear contract to
avoid legal problems. Key points to be developed include
breach reporting, better logging mechanisms and engi-
neering of large scale computer systems, which encom-
pass the isolation of virtual machines, resources and
information. Their analysis is based not only on what is
currently observed, but also on what can be improved
through the adoption of existing best practices or by
means of solutions that are already used in non-cloud
environments. This article aims at taking one step fur-
ther by transforming these observations into numbers – a
quantitative approach.
CSA
CSA is an organization led by a coalition of industry
practitioners, corporations, associations and other stake-
holders [63], such as Dell, HP and eBay. One of its main
goals is to promote the adoption of best practices for
providing security within cloud computing environments.
Three CSA documents are analyzed in this paper – the
security guidance [6], the top threats in cloud computing
[12] and the Trusted Cloud Initiative (TCI) architecture
[64] – as they comprise most of the concepts and guide-
lines researched and published by CSA.
The latest CSA security guidance (version 3.0 [65])
denotesmulti-tenancy as the essential cloud characteristic
while virtualization can be avoided when implementing
cloud infrastructures – multi-tenancy only implies the
use of shared resources by multiple consumers, possibly
from diﬀerent organizations or with diﬀerent objectives.
They discuss that, even if virtualization-related issues
can be circumvented, segmentation and isolated policies
for addressing proper management and privacy are still
required. The document also establishes thirteen security
domains:
1. Governance and risk management: ability to measure
the risk introduced by adopting cloud computing
solutions, such as legal issues, protection of sensitive
data and their relation to international boundaries;
2. Legal issues: disclosure laws, shared infrastructures
and interference between diﬀerent users;
3. Compliance and audit: the relationship between
cloud computing and internal security policies;
4. Information management and data security:
identiﬁcation and control of stored data, loss of
physical control of data and related policies to
minimize risks and possible damages;
5. Portability and interoperability: ability to change
providers, services or bringing back data to local
premises without major impacts;
6. Traditional security, business continuity and disaster
recovery: the inﬂuence of cloud solutions on
traditional processes applied for addressing security
needs;
7. Data center operations: analyzing architecture and
operations from data centers and identifying
essential characteristics for ensuring stability;
8. Incident response, notiﬁcation and remediation:
policies for handling incidents;
9. Application security: aims to identify the possible
security issues raised from migrating a speciﬁc
solution to the cloud and which platform (among SPI
model) is more adequate;
10. Encryption and key management: how higher
scalability via infrastructure sharing aﬀects
encryption and other mechanisms used for
protecting resources and data;
11. Identity and access management: enabling
authentication for cloud solutions while maintaining
security levels and availability for customers and
organizations;
12. Virtualization: risks related to multi-tenancy,
isolation, virtual machine co-residence and
hypervisor vulnerabilities, all introduced by
virtualization technologies;
13. Security as a service: third party security
mechanisms, delegating security responsibilities to a
trusted third party provider;
CSA also published a document focusing on identify-
ing top threats, aiming to aid risk management strategies
when cloud solutions are adopted [12]. As a complete
list of threats and pertinent issues is countless, the doc-
ument targets those that are speciﬁc or intensiﬁed by
fundamental characteristics of the cloud, such as shared
infrastructures and greater ﬂexibility. As a result, seven
threats were selected:
1. Abuse and nefarious used of cloud computing: while
providing ﬂexible and powerful resources and tools,
IaaS and PaaS solutions also unveil critical
exploitation possibilities built on anonymity. This
leads to abuse and misuse of the provided
infrastructure for conducting distributed denial of
service attacks, hosting malicious data, controlling
botnets or sending spam;
2. Insecure application programming interfaces: cloud
services provide APIs for management, storage,
virtual machine allocation and other service-speciﬁc
operations. The interfaces provided must implement
security methods to identify, authenticate and protect
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against accidental or malicious use, which can
introduce additional complexities to the system such
as the need for third-party authorities and services;
3. Malicious insiders: although not speciﬁc to cloud
computing, its eﬀects are ampliﬁed by the
concentration and interaction of services and
management domains;
4. Shared technology vulnerabilities: scalability
provided by cloud solutions are based on hardware
and software components which are not originally
designed to provide isolation. Even though
hypervisors oﬀer an extra granularity layer, they still
exhibit ﬂaws which are exploited for privilege
escalation;
5. Data loss and leakage: insuﬃcient controls
concerning user access and data security (including
privacy and integrity), as well as disposal and even
legal issues;
6. Account, service and traﬃc hijacking: phishing and
related frauds are not a novelty to computing
security. However, not only an attacker is able to
manipulate data and transactions, but also to use
stolen credentials to perform other attacks that
compromise customer and provider reputation.
7. Unknown risk proﬁle: delegation of control over data
and infrastructure allows companies to better
concentrate on their core business, possibly
maximizing proﬁt and eﬃciency. On the other hand,
the consequent loss of governance leads to obscurity
[66]: information about other customers sharing the
same infrastructure or regarding patching and
updating policies is limited. This situation creates
uncertainty concerning the exact risk levels that are
inherent to the cloud solution;
It is interesting to notice the choice for cloud-speciﬁc
issues as it allows the identiﬁcation of central points
for further development. Moreover, this compilation of
threats is closely related to CSA security guidance, com-
posing a solid framework for security and risk analysis
assessments while providing recommendations and best
practices to achieve acceptable security levels.
Another approach adopted by CSA for organizing infor-
mation related to cloud security and governance is the
TCI Reference Architecture Model [64]. This document
focuses on deﬁning guidelines for enabling trust in the
cloud while establishing open standards and capabilities
for all cloud-based operations. The architecture deﬁnes
diﬀerent organization levels by combining frameworks
like the SPI model, ISO 27002, COBIT, PCI, SOX and
architectures such as SABSA, TOGAF, ITIL and Jeri-
cho. A wide range of aspects are then covered: SABSA
deﬁnes business operation support services, such as com-
pliance, data governance, operational risk management,
human resources security, security monitoring services,
legal services and internal investigations; TOGAF deﬁnes
the types of services covered (presentation, application,
information and infrastructure; ITIL is used for informa-
tion technology operation and support, from IT oper-
ation to service delivery, support and management of
incidents, changes and resources; ﬁnally, Jericho cov-
ers security and risk management, including information
security management, authorization, threat and vulnera-
bility management, policies and standards. The result is a
tri-dimensional relationship between cloud delivery, trust
and operation that aims to be easily consumed and applied
in a security-oriented design.
NIST
NIST has recently published a taxonomy for security in
cloud computing [67] that is comparable to the taxonomy
introduced in section “Cloud computing security taxon-
omy”. This taxonomy’s ﬁrst level encompass typical roles
in the cloud environment: cloud service provider, respon-
sible for making the service itself available; cloud service
consumer, who uses the service and maintains a business
relationship with the provider; cloud carrier, which pro-
vides communication interfaces between providers and
consumers; cloud broker, that manages use, performance
and delivery of services and intermediates negotiations
between providers and consumers; and cloud auditor,
which performs assessment of services, operations and
security. Each role is associated to their respective activ-
ities and decomposed on their components and subcom-
ponents. The clearest diﬀerence from our taxonomy is the
hierarchy adopted, as our proposal primarily focuses on
security principles in its higher level perspective, while
the cloud roles are explored in deeper levels. The con-
cepts presented here extend NIST’s initial deﬁnition for
cloud computing [9], incorporating a division of roles and
responsibilities that can be directly applied to security
assessments. On the other hand, NIST’s taxonomy incor-
porates concepts such as deployment models, service
types and activities related to cloud management (porta-
bility, interoperability, provisioning), most of them largely
employed in publications related to cloud computing –
including this one.
Frameworks summary
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the information about each
framework.
Books, papers and other publications
Rimal, Choi and Lumb [3] present a cloud taxonomy
created from the perspective of the academia, developers
and researchers, instead of the usual point of view related
to vendors. Whilst they do provide deﬁnitions and con-
cepts such as cloud architecture (based on SPI model),
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Table 1 Summary of CSA security frameworks
Framework Objectives Structure and comments
CSA Guidance
• Recommendations for reducing risks
• No restrictions regarding speciﬁc
solutions or service types
• Guidelines not necessarily applicable
for all deployment models
• Provide initial structure to divide eﬀorts
for researches
• One architectural domain
• Governance domains: risk management, legal concerns, compliance,
auditing, information management, interoperability and portability
• Operational domains: traditional and business security, disaster recovery,
data center operations, encryption, application security, identiﬁcation,
authorization, virtualization, security outsourcing
• Emphasis on the fact that cloud is not bound to virtualization technologies,
though cloud services heavily depend on virtualized infrastructures to
provide ﬂexibility and scalability
CSA Top Threats
• Provide context for risk management
decisions and strategies
• Focus on issues which are unique or
highly inﬂuenced by cloud computing
characteristics
• Seven main threats:
– Abuse and malicious use of cloud resources
– Insecure APIs
– Malicious insiders
– Shared technology vulnerabilities
– Data loss and leakage
– Hijacking of accounts, services and traﬃc
– Unknown risk proﬁle (security obscurity)
• Summarizes information on top threats and provide examples, remediation
guidelines, impact caused and which service types (based on SPI model)
are aﬀected
CSA Architecture
• Enable trust in the cloud based on
well-known standards and certiﬁcations
allied to security frameworks and other
open references
• Use widely adopted frameworks in
order to achieve standardization of
policies and best practices based on
already accepted security principles
• Four sets of frameworks (security, NIST SPI, IT audit and legislative) and four
architectural domains (SABSA business architecture, ITIL for services
management, Jericho for security and TOGAF for IT reference)
• Tridimensional structure based on premises of cloud delivery, trust and
operations
• Concentrates a plethora of concepts and information related to services
operation and security
Table summarizing information related to CSA security frameworks (guidance, top threats and TCI architecture).
virtualization management, service types, fault tolerance
policies and security, no further studies are developed
focusing on cloud speciﬁc security aspects. This charac-
teristic is also observed in other cloud taxonomies [68-70]
whose eﬀorts converge to the deﬁnition of service models
and types rather than to more technical aspects such as
security, privacy or compliance concerns – which are the
focus of this paper.
In [7], Mather, Kumaraswamy and Latif discuss the
current status of cloud security and what is predicted
for the future. The result is a compilation of security-
related subjects to be developed in topics like infras-
tructure, data security and storage, identity and access
management, security management, privacy, audit and
compliance. They also explore the unquestionable urge for
more transparency regarding which party (customer or
cloud provider) provides each security capability, as well
as the need for standardization and for the creation of
legal agreements reﬂecting operational SLAs. Other issues
discussed are the inadequate encryption and key manage-
ment capabilities currently oﬀered, as well as the need for
multi-entity key management.
Many publications also state the need for better security
mechanisms for cloud environments. Doelitzscher et al.
[71] emphasize security as a major research area in cloud
computing. They also highlight the lack of ﬂexibility of
classic intrusion detection mechanisms to handle virtual-
ized environments, suggesting the use of special security
audit tools associated to business ﬂow modeling through
security SLAs. In addition, they identify abuse of cloud
resources, lack of security monitoring in cloud infrastruc-
ture and defective isolation of shared resources as focal
points to be managed. Their analysis of top security con-
cerns is also based on publications from CSA, ENISA and
others, but after a quick evaluation of issues their focus
switch to their security auditing solution, without oﬀer-
ing a deeper quantitative compilation of security risks and
areas of concern.
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Table 2 Summary of ENISA and NIST security frameworks
Framework Objectives Structure and comments
ENISA Report
• Study on beneﬁts and risks when
adopting cloud solutions for business
operations
• Provide information for security
assessments and decision making
• Three main categories of cloud speciﬁc risks (policy and organizational,
technical, legal) plus one extra category for not speciﬁc ones
• Oﬀers basic guidelines and best practices for avoiding or mitigating their
eﬀects
• Presents recommendations for further studies related to trust building
(certiﬁcations, metrics and transparency), large scale data protection
(privacy, integrity, incident handling and regulations) and technical
aspects (isolation, portability and resilience)
• Highlights the duality of scalability (fast, ﬂexible and accessible resources
versus concentrations of data attracting attackers and also providing
infrastructure for aiding their operations)
• Extensive study on risks considering their impact and probability
NIST Taxonomy
• Deﬁne what cloud services should
provide rather than how to design and
implement solutions
• Ease the understanding of cloud
internal operations and mechanisms
• Taxonomy levels:
– First level: cloud roles (service provider, consumer, cloud broker,
cloud carrier and cloud auditor)
– Second level: activities performed by each role (cloud
management, service deployment, cloud access and service
consumption)
– Third and following levels: elements which compose each activity
(deployment models, service types and auditing elements)
• Based on publication SP 500-292, highlighting the importance of security,
privacy and levels of conﬁdence and trust to increase technology
acceptance
• Concentrates many useful concepts, such as models for deploying or
classifying services
Table summarizing information on ENISA and NIST security frameworks.
Associations such as the Enterprise Strategy Group
[72] emphasize the need for hypervisor security, shrink-
ing hypervisor footprints, deﬁning the security perimeter
virtualization, and linking security and VM provision-
ing for better resource management. Aiming to address
these requirements, they suggest the use of increased
automation for security controls, VM identity manage-
ment (built on top of Public Key Infrastructure and Open
Virtualization Format) and data encryption (tightly con-
nected to state-of-art key management practices).Wallom
et al. [73] emphasize the need of guaranteeing virtual
machines’ trustworthiness (regarding origin and identity)
to perform security-critical computations and to han-
dle sensitive data, therefore presenting a solution which
integrates Trusted Computing technologies and avail-
able cloud infrastructures. Dabrowski and Mills [74] used
simulation to demonstrate virtual machine leakage and
resource exhaustion scenarios leading to degraded per-
formance and crashes; they also propose the addition
of orphan controls to enable the virtualized cloud envi-
ronment to oﬀer higher availability levels while keeping
overhead costs under control. Ristenpart et al. [44] also
explore virtual machine exploitation focusing on informa-
tion leakage, specially sensitive data at rest or in transit.
Finally, Chadwick and Casenove [75] describe a security
API for federated access to cloud resources and authority
delegation while setting ﬁne-grained controls and guar-
anteeing the required levels of assurance inside cloud
environments. These publications highlight the need of
security improvements related to virtual machines and
virtualization techniques, concern that this paper demon-
strates to be valid and urgent.
Discussion
Considering the points raised in the previous section, a
straightforward conclusion is that cloud security includes
old and well-known issues – such as network and other
infrastructural vulnerabilities, user access, authentication
and privacy – and also novel concerns derived from
new technologies adopted to oﬀer the adequate resources
(mainly virtualized ones), services and auxiliary tools.
These problems are summarized by isolation and hypervi-
sor vulnerabilities (the main technical concerns according
to the studies and graphics presented), data location and
e-discovery (legal aspects), and loss of governance over
data, security and even decision making (in which the
cloud must be strategically and ﬁnancially considered as a
decisive factor).
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Another point observed is that, even though adopt-
ing a cloud service or provider may be easy, migrating
to another is not [76]. After moving local data and pro-
cesses to the cloud, the lack of standards for protocols
and formats directly aﬀects attempts to migrate to a dif-
ferent provider even if this is motivated by legitimate rea-
sons such as non-fulﬁllment of SLAs, outages or provider
bankruptcy [77]. Consequently, the ﬁrst choice must be
carefully made, as SLAs are not perfect and services
outages happen at the same pace that resource sharing,
multi-tenancy and scalability are not fail proof. After a
decision is made, future migrations between services can
be extremely onerous in terms of time and costs; most
likely, this task will require an extensive work for bring-
ing all data and resources to a local infrastructure before
redeploying them into the cloud.
Finally, the analysis of current trends for cloud comput-
ing reveals that there is a considerable number of well-
studied security concerns, for which plenty solutions and
best practices have been developed, such as those related
to legal and administrative concerns. On the other hand,
many issues still require further research eﬀort, especially
those related to secure virtualization.
Considerations and future work
Security is a crucial aspect for providing a reliable envi-
ronment and then enable the use of applications in the
cloud and for moving data and business processes to
virtualized infrastructures. Many of the security issues
identiﬁed are observed in other computing environments:
authentication, network security and legal requirements,
for example, are not a novelty. However, the impact of
such issues is intensiﬁed in cloud computing due to
characteristics such as multi-tenancy and resource shar-
ing, since actions from a single customer can aﬀect all
other users that inevitably share the same resources and
interfaces. On the other hand, eﬃcient and secure vir-
tualization represents a new challenge in such a context
with high distribution of complex services and web-
based applications, thus requiring more sophisticated
approaches. At the same time, our quantitative analysis
indicates that virtualization remains an underserved area
regarding the number of solutions provided to identiﬁed
concerns.
It is strategic to develop new mechanisms that pro-
vide the required security level by isolating virtual
machines and the associated resources while following
best practices in terms of legal regulations and compli-
ance to SLAs. Among other requirements, such solutions
should employ virtual machine identiﬁcation, provide
an adequate separation of dedicated resources com-
bined with a constant observation of shared ones, and
examine any attempt of exploiting cross-VM and data
leakage.
A secure cloud computing environment depends on
several security solutions working harmoniously together.
However, in our studies we did not identify any security
solutions provider owning the facilities necessary to get
high levels of security conformity for clouds. Thus, cloud
providers need to orchestrate / harmonize security solu-
tions from diﬀerent places in order to achieve the desired
security level.
In order to verify these conclusions in practice, we
deployed testbeds using OpenNebula (based on KVM and
XEN) and analyzed its security aspects; we also analyzed
virtualized servers based on VMWARE using our testbed
networks. This investigation lead to a wide research of
PaaS solutions, and allowed us to verify that most of them
use virtual machines based on virtualization technolo-
gies such as VMWARE, XEN, and KVM, which often lack
security aspects We also learned that Amazon changed
the XEN source code in order to include security fea-
tures, but unfortunately the modiﬁed code is not publicly
available and there appears to be no article detailing the
changes introduced. Given these limitations, a deeper
study on current security solutions to manage cloud com-
puting virtual machines inside the cloud providers should
be a focus of future work in the area. We are also working
on a testbed based on OpenStack for researches related
to identity and credentials management in the cloud envi-
ronment. This work should address basic needs for better
security mechanisms in virtualized and distributed archi-
tectures, guiding other future researches in the security
area.
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